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Mark Johnston (2016, 2017) has raised concerns that a worm-theoretic account of persistence 
through time is incompatible with ethical singularity: that within the life of any actual person, 
there is only one morally considerable being, namely that person. To deny ethical singularity is 
to deny a core feature of our ordinary ethical and prudential thinking. The worm theory, Johnston 
concludes, proves to be “disastrous … for our ordinary moral outlook”. This paper defends the 
worm theory from Johnston’s argument. Though I agree that the worm theory must deny ethical 
singularity, it can nevertheless be squared with our ordinary ethical thinking by adopting a 
temporal counterpart analysis of temporal predication (‘x will be F’, ‘x was previously F’, etc.) for 
those morally considerable beings involved in a person’s life that are not the person.  
 














Derek Parfit’s discussion of personal identity challenges our ordinary belief that what 
matters in survival is identity.1 David Lewis’s response to Parfit is well-known: if we accept a 
worm-theoretic account of persistence through time, we can maintain the commonsense view 
that what matters is identity while also accepting Parfit’s thesis that it’s psychological continuity 
and connectedness that really matter.2 More recently, Mark Johnston has raised concerns that 
Lewis’s worm theory is not so congenial to commonsense; this metaphysics is in deep tension 
with our ordinary conception of ethics and practical rationality.3 This essay addresses Johnston’s 
argument and attempts to square commonsense belief with Lewis’s worm theory.  
In §1, I present the relevant details of the worm theory along with Johnston’s case that it 
and our ordinary ethical and prudential outlook are in tension. The source of the problem is that 
the worm theory undermines ethical singularity: that within the life of any person, there is only 
one morally considerable being, namely that person.4 My interest is not in challenging this stage 
of Johnston’s argument. I agree that the worm theorist must deny ethical singularity. In §2, I 
begin my case that this isn’t the problem Johnston thinks it is. To do this, I appeal to an alternative 
four-dimensionalist metaphysics, the stage theory, and its counterpart-theoretic account of 
temporal predication as developed by Ted Sider.5 In §3, I argue that the worm theory has a 
theoretical need to incorporate this account of predication into their view and then go on to 
detail how it undermines Johnston’s argument.   
 
1 Parfit (1971, 1984) 
2 Lewis (1983a) 
3 Johnston (2016, 2017); cf. Olson (2010) 
4 Johnston (2016: 216; 2017: 641) 
5 Sider (1996, 2001) 
§1 The Worm Theory and Johnston’s Personite Problem     
The worm theory is one version of four-dimensionalism. On this view, continuant material 
objects are four-dimensional entities or space-time worms, that is, aggregates or fusions of 
momentary temporal parts or stages.6 Our ordinary talk of continuant persons and other 
persisting objects quantifies over these four-dimensional entities and not usually over the 
momentary stages which compose them. You and I are continuant persons, that is, we persist 
through time by virtue of having different temporal parts or person-stages existing at different 
times. Person-stages are united together into a single continuant person in virtue of being related 
to one another by way of some continuity relation R (e.g., bodily continuity, psychological 
continuity). As Lewis formulates this view, “Something is a continuant person if and only if it is a 
maximal R-interrelated aggregate of person-stages. That is: if and only if it is an aggregate of 
person-stages, each of which is R-related to all the rest (and to itself), and it is a proper part of 
no other such aggregate”.7 Since person-stages are central to the worm theory and my discussion 
of Johnston’s argument, it’s worth getting clear on what they are supposed to be.  
Lewis explains, 
A person-stage is a physical object, just as a person is … It does many of the same things 
that a person does: it talks and walks and thinks, it has beliefs and desires, it has a size 
and shape and location. It even has a temporal duration. But only a brief one, for it does 
not last long … It begins to exist abruptly, and it abruptly ceases to exist soon after.8  
 
6 Sider defines a stage as follows: x is a momentary temporal part or stage of y at some instant t if and only if x exists 
at and only at t, x is a part of y at t, and x overlaps at t everything that is part of y at t (Sider 2001: 59). 
7 Lewis (1983a: 60) 
8 Lewis (1983a: 76) 
By ‘person-stage’ Lewis means the briefest temporal part of a person.9 Moreover, by ‘person-
segment’ I shall mean a non-maximal aggregate of R-interrelated person-stages. Andrew-during-
grad-school is a person-segment but so is Andrew-this-morning-before-coffee. Lewis maintains 
our ordinary predicate ‘x is a person’ applies only to maximal aggregates of R-interrelated person-
stages and not to person-stages or person-segments. 
 Despite person-segments not being persons, we may wonder whether they are 
nevertheless morally considerable beings, that is, beings who have moral standing. Let us restrict 
our attention to those person-segments whose temporal extent is long enough to “exhibit a 
developing individual personality”.10 Johnston argues that such person-segments are intrinsically 
similar to possible persons. Since persons are morally considerable beings, it follows that these 
longish person-segments are also morally considerable beings.11 Johnston dubs the longish 
person-segments of any actual person ‘personites’. Personites are “shorter-lived very person-like 
things that extend across part, but not the whole, of a person’s life”.12 
This argument shows that on the worm theory ethical singularity is not just an 
underestimate, but a radical underestimate, of the number of morally considerable beings within 
 
9 How brief? Since it will not impact the discussion that follows, we can keep it vague: it’s very brief. Katherine Hawley 
(2002: 50 – 53) argues that stages must be as fine-grained as possible change. Moreover, if ordinary material objects 
have three-dimensional shape properties such as being spherical, there must be things which are three-dimensional. 
The worm theorist understands these three-dimensional objects to be the stages that compose the continuant 
objects we quantify over in ordinary discourse.  
10 Johnston (2016: 200) 
11 The argument runs roughly as follows: (p1) For any possible world w and possible object x, if x is a person in w, 
then x is a morally considerable being in w. (p2) For any possible worlds w and v and possible objects x and y, if x in 
w is sufficiently similar in its intrinsic features to y in v, then x in w is a morally considerable being in w iff y is a 
morally considerable being in v. (p3) For any actual longish person-segment x, there is a possible object y in world w 
such that y is a person in w and is sufficiently similar in its intrinsic features to x. Therefore, (c) any actual longish 
person segment is a morally considerable being. See Johnston (2016: 203 – 204). 
12 Johnston (2016: 199) 
the life of any actual person.13 Andrew is the maximal aggregate of R-interrelated person-stages 
whose first stage exists at some time in ‘84 and whose last stage exists (hopefully!) at some time 
in the distant future. But there also exists one of Andrew’s personites, a non-maximal aggregate 
of R-interrelated person-stages whose first stage is identical to Andrew’s ‘84 stage but whose last 
stage is identical to Andrew’s last stage during his graduate studies. Shorten or lengthen that 
person-segment and we get very many other personites besides. For any actual person, there are 
many numerically distinct morally considerable beings involved in their life.14 Consequently, 
ethical singularity is false. 
 Johnston raises several different issues for the worm theory but each one depends on the 
fact that a person and its personites have differing temporal extent. Andrew chooses to attend 
graduate school and knows it will challenge him. He expects there to be many nights agonizing 
over term papers, not to mention the pain and suffering involved in dissertation writing and 
grading undergraduate essays. Yet, he has good reason to believe the hardships he’s choosing to 
bring upon himself will pay off in the future: doing philosophy for a living promises to make the 
remainder of his life a happy one. This kind of choice is familiar and ordinarily believed to be 
morally unproblematic. As Johnston says, prudential self-sacrifice “seems to be the backbone of 
any minimally well-ordered life”.15 Part of the rationale for this judgment is that it is Andrew who 
 
13 Kasierman (2019: 218) argues that the stage theory can resist Johnston’s argument for personites. The stage 
theorist should deny (p3): no actual person-segment is sufficiently intrinsically similar to a possible person since, on 
this view, persons are person-stages and not maximal fusions thereof. Thus, Johnston’s personite problem is only a 
problem for the worm theory. However, David Brink (1997: 111 –116) argues that the stage theory is incompatible 
with elements of rational egoism. Though for the reasons discussed later in regards to how temporal predication 
works for this view, I do not think Brink’s arguments are successful. See Hawley 2002: 65 – 67) for similar remarks.  
14 Perhaps infinitely many if time is dense or continuous. Hawley (2002: 51) touches on this point. But see also 
Johnston (2017: 637 – 641). 
15 Johnston (2017: 623) 
has assumed the costs and it is Andrew who will reap the benefits. All of this is true on the worm 
theory since Andrew is a four-dimensional object who has temporal parts existing at both the 
time of the costs suffered and the benefits received. Ordinarily, we would assume that no other 
morally considerable being is involved in Andrew’s prudentially-driven choice. But this is not so 
if ethical singularity is denied. 
Consider again Andrew’s personite, call it Andrew-minus, whose first stage is Andrew’s 
first stage but whose last stage is Andrew’s last stage during his graduate studies. This personite 
will not reap any of the benefits from the choice to attend graduate school but it is around to 
suffer all the hardship. And Andrew-minus is not the only morally considerable being in this 
position. Very many other of Andrew’s personites do not include any post-graduate school 
stages; so, they too suffer the costs and will not receive any of the future benefits. If Andrew 
attends graduate school, he will be “pressing all those personites into a scheme which 
significantly benefits [him], but imposes a real cost on them … for which they are not 
compensated by way of any subsequent benefit”.16 On this basis, Johnston argues that Andrew’s 
prudentially-driven choice is morally objectionable. The kind of choice which is the backbone of 
a minimally well-ordered life would, on the worm theory, seem to be “steeped in great 
wronging!”.17 The personite problem is “disastrous … for our ordinary moral outlook”.18    
In the following sections, I argue that a worm theorist can and should deny Johnston’s 
claim that personites like Andrew-minus will not receive any compensating benefits.19 My case 
 
16 Johnston (2017: 623 – 624) 
17 ibid. 
18 Johnston (2016: 206) 
19 Johnston discusses several responses on behalf of the worm theorist: an appeal to consent (2017: 631 – 632), an 
appeal to versions of consequentialism where the number of morally considerable beings does not matter (2017: 
635 – 641), and an attempt to deny personites moral standing (2016: 202 – 203). How successful any of these 
for this depends on extending a counterpart-theoretic account of temporal predication for 
person-stages to personites. Johnston’s case that the worm theory threatens our ordinary ethical 
outlook depends on some personite involved in a person’s life suffering uncompensated costs. If 
this is false, Johnston’s case will prove unsuccessful.     
§2 The Stage Theory and Counterpart-theoretic Temporal Predication     
The stage theory is another version of four-dimensionalism. On this view, continuant 
material objects are not aggregates of momentary temporal parts or stages but the stages 
themselves.20 The stage theory differs from the worm theory by claiming that our ordinary talk 
of persons and other persisting objects quantifies over momentary stages and not usually over 
the four-dimensional objects which are composed of those stages.21 One immediate objection to 
the stage theory is that if you and I are person-stages, we are not continuant persons and do no 
persist through time. After all, a person-stage is very brief, “it begins to exist abruptly, and it 
abruptly ceases to exist soon after”.22 The stage theorist accepts that there is a sense in which 
you and I do not persist through time: it is false that you and I exist at more than one time. 
However, the stage theorist maintains there is another sense of persistence: you and I exist now, 
we will exist in the future, and we previously existed in the past.23 Stage-theoretic persistence 
 
objections are and whether Johnston’s responses are sufficient is not pertinent to the task of this essay. Instead, I 
want to engage with Johnston’s argument from a different direction. 
20 For a defense of stage theory, see Sider (1996, 2001) and Hawley (2002). 
21 Sider (1996, 2001) accepts stages and fusions of stages but this is not required by the stage theory. Hawley (2001: 
52) seems to accept a version of stage theory that does not (or need not) endorse fusions of stages. The discussion 
that follows assumes Sider’s version of the stage theory. 
22 Lewis (1983a: 76) 
23 Sider (1996: 446). Sider goes on to claim, “All that can be counted part of common sense is that objects typically 
have temporal properties (like existing ten minutes ago), and the stage view is consistent with this part of common 
sense. Further claims about the analysis of such properties are theoretical, not part of common sense, and so a 
theory that looks best from the perspective of a global cost-benefit analysis is free to employ a non-standard analysis 
of temporal predication” (Sider 1996: 447). 
consists in the conditions under which tensed sentences such as ‘x will exist in the future’, ‘x 
previously existed in the past’, etc. come out true. The analysis of this sort of temporal 
predication is central to the view. 
 Stage theorists provide a counterpart-theoretic analysis of temporal predication. A tensed 
sentence such as ‘Andrew was once a graduate student’ is analyzed as meaning that there is 
some past person-stage x such that x is a graduate student and x is R-related to Andrew (where 
the R-relation is your favored continuity relation).24 In other words, Andrew was once a graduate 
student because Andrew has a past “temporal counterpart” that is a graduate student where 
Andrew’s temporal counterparts are those person-stages R-related to Andrew.25  
 Consider how this account handles the temporal predications relevant to Johnston’s 
argument. Suppose Andrew is the present person-stage suffering the hardships of graduate 
school. Although Andrew is identical neither to any future person-stage who receives the benefit 
nor to any past person-stage who made the choice to attend, it is nevertheless true that Andrew 
will receive the benefit and that he previously made the choice because he has a temporal 
counterpart that receives the benefit and one that made the choice. Person-stages (and so 
persons) have temporal properties or satisfy temporal predicates in virtue of the properties of 
their temporal counterparts, that is, those past and future person-stages R-related to them. 
 
24 Sider (1996: 438). It is worth stating for the sake of thoroughness that the analysis assumes the B-theory of time 
which is the conjunction of eternalism and a reduction of tensed talk to tenseless talk. For the most part, I leave 
tensed talk in the truth-conditions for temporal predications unreduced. See Sider (2001: Ch. 2). 
25 Relatedly, a stage’s satisfaction of a so-called lingering predicate – one which it takes time to satisfy – has to be 
analyzed as the instantiation of a relation to its temporal counterparts. It is true that Andrew is thinking about Vienna 
because he stands in an appropriate network of counterpart relations to other stages with appropriate features. See 
Sider (1996: 449 & 2001: 198). The same holds true for Hawley’s version of stage theory. She writes, “True, an 
isolated stage could not satisfy such [lingering] predicates … But an instantaneous stage can satisfy such predicates 
if it is suitably surrounded by and related to other stages with appropriate properties” (Hawley 2002: 54). In fact, 
Hawley argues that most sortal predicates including ‘x is a person’ require the satisfaction of lingering predicates. 
§3 The Worm Theory and Counterpart-theoretic Temporal Predication     
On the worm theory, talk of persons normally quantifies over the maximal aggregates of 
R-interrelated person-stages and not the stages or segments that are proper parts of these four-
dimensional objects. So, the counterpart-theoretic analysis of temporal predication isn’t needed 
for our ordinary talk of persons having temporal properties. For example, the tensed sentence 
‘Andrew was once a graduate student’ is analyzed as meaning that Andrew has a past temporal 
part that is a graduate student. In general, temporal predications to persons are understood in 
terms of stages or segments at appropriate times having the right properties. It seems, then, we 
have no reason to apply a counterpart-theoretic analysis of temporal predication to talk of 
persons. However, I argue there is a theoretical need for the worm theorist to extend 
counterpart-theoretic temporal predication to talk of personites. 
Let’s first apply the account to the predications relevant to Johnston’s argument. His case 
that the worm theory threatens our ordinary ethical outlook depends on some personite 
involved in a person’s life suffering uncompensated costs. Although Andrew-minus suffers the 
hardships of graduate school, it has no post-graduate school stages and so it will not receive any 
compensating benefits. As I will argue below, since Johnston’s argument invites us to consider 
person-segments, the relevant temporal predication should be given a non-standard analysis 
such as the counterpart analysis. The sentence ‘Andrew-minus will not receive any compensating 
benefits’ should be analyzed as meaning that there is no future personite x such that x receives 
a compensating benefit and x is R-related to Andrew-minus. In other words, Andrew-minus has 
no future temporal counterpart who benefits. But this is false: there is some temporal 
counterpart of Andrew-minus that receives a benefit, namely any of Andrew’s personites who 
include happy, philosophizing post-graduate school person-stages. Similar to the stage theory, a 
worm theorist should hold that some of a personite’s temporal properties are had in virtue of 
the properties of their temporal counterparts, those personites R-related to them. 
Is there independent motivation for extending this account to personites? The need for 
such an account arises given that the worm theory gets the intuitively wrong verdict in some 
cases of synchronic counting. If no person-stage is ever part of more than one person, then 
counting persons at a time and counting stages then will always agree. However, part of the 
theoretical benefit of adopting the worm theory is its solution to the problem of fission. As we 
would ordinarily describe it, fission is where one person “divides” into two persons. Yet, 
according to the worm theory, our intuitive count before fission is wrong. What we have prior to 
fission is a single person-stage shared by two continuant persons. The worm theory seems forced 
to say that we bungle a case of synchronic counting.26  
Lewis explains our intuition that there is one person before fission by admitting that 
sometimes we do not always count by identity. Ordinarily, when we ask ‘How many persons?’, 
we are asking ‘How many numerically distinct persons?’ but sometimes such questions invoke a 
relation weaker than identity, say, identity-at-t.27 In these contexts, we end up counting stages 
rather than persons. Moreover, if the worm theorist is forced to admit we sometimes count by a 
relation that isn’t identity, it seems arbitrary to insist that it is only ever identity-at-t. Other 
relations weaker than identity also explain our intuition that there is only one person before 
 
26 Similar issues with synchronic counting may arise in cases of time travel. If I were to travel back in time to visit my 
past self in graduate school, the worm theorist says that I have more than one person-stage at that past time. We 
have here a single person talking to himself. Yet, there is some intuitive pull to describe the scenario as involving 
two persons (though I think the intuition is less strong than in cases of fission). See Lewis (1976) for discussion. 
27 Lewis (1983a: 63) 
fission. We may count person-segments by counting by identity-over-a-period. If the relevant 
period is pre-fission, we’d get the same answer as counting by identity-at-t for times before 
fission. Synchronic counting demands a partial retreat: in this context, the worm theorist has to 
construe talk of “persons” as involving quantification over stages and segments. 
 In contexts where we are counting stages or segments, we may also wish to say something 
about the entities we’ve counted. We may want to ask and answer questions that concern their 
temporal properties such as ‘Will Andrew be either of the post-fission persons?’ (where ‘Andrew’ 
picks out a pre-fission stage or segment). I submit this generates a need for a non-standard 
account of temporal predication: in such contexts, some of our temporal predications to 
“persons” must be analyzed in a way different from the standard account offered by the worm 
theorist for the more usual contexts where quantification is over maximal aggregates of R-
interrelated person-stages. The counterpart-theoretic analysis is well-suited to fulfill this role.28 
Independent of replying to Johnston’s argument, the worm theory should apply a counterpart-
theoretic account of temporal predication to person-segments and thus to personites. 
 I believe this consideration is bolstered when we recognize that a parallel need arises for 
the stage theory in cases of diachronic counting. If we ask from a timeless perspective ‘How many 
people have been speaking during the last ten minutes?’, the stage theory has some explaining 
to do. Since persons are person-stages, there have been very many persons speaking during this 
 
28 Where the context involves quantification over stages or segments and so the proper name ‘Andrew’ refers to 
one or other of these entities, the sentence ‘Andrew will be a post-fission person’ should be analyzed as meaning 
there is an x such that x exists after fission and x is R-related to Andrew. Assuming whatever happens in fission 
preserves the R-relation, it is true that Andrew will be identical to a post-fission entity. In fact, Andrew will be each 
post-fission entity. There’s no incompatibility with transitivity here since the counterpart relation that makes it true 
that Andrew will be each post-fission entity is not identity. See Sider (1996: 438 – 439). 
period.29 This, of course, does not agree with our intuitive count. In these contexts, our talk of 
“persons” quantifies over maximal aggregates of R-interrelated person-stages rather than the 
stages themselves.30 Since we count the spacetime worms and not their stages, we may want to 
talk about the entities we’ve counted and ascribe them temporal properties. In such contexts, 
the stage theory should help itself to the standard account of temporal predication provided by 
the worm theory. Both versions of four-dimensionalism need to recognize contextual shifts in the 
objects we quantify over in our talk of persons and this opens the door for a non-standard 
analysis of temporal predication to the relevant entities in such contexts.     
Conclusion 
A worm theorist can and I think should agree that ethical singularity is false: there are 
very many morally considerable beings involved in the life of any single person. However, 
Johnston’s argument that the worm theorist’s denial of ethical singularity threatens our ordinary 
ethical outlook depends on some personite involved in a person’s life suffering uncompensated 
costs. I’ve argued that this portion of Johnston’s argument is not successful. The worm theory 
proves resilient to Johnston’s personite problem if a counterpart-theoretic account of temporal 
predication is extended to our talk of personites. 
It is worth clarifying that the counterpart-theoretic account applies only to some of a 
personite’s temporal properties. Consider, for instance, one of Andrew’s personites whose 
temporal extent is longer than Andrew-minus’ and includes some of the happy, philosophizing 
post-graduate school stages. Call this personite ‘Andrew-minus+’. The sentence ‘Andrew-minus+ 
 
29 Perhaps infinitely many. See fn. 14.  
30 Sider (1996: 448) 
will not receive any compensating benefits’ should be analyzed in the standard worm-theoretic 
fashion, namely as meaning that Andrew-minus+ has no future stage that receives a 
compensating benefit. This, of course, is false and its falsity does not concern any temporal 
counterpart of Andrew-minus+. In general, I believe the worm theorist will have to recognize that 
their account of temporal predication to personites will be disjunctive in character: a personite P 
will be F iff either P includes a future F-stage or one of P’s future temporal counterparts includes 
an F-stage.  
This may not be, however, a serious drawback despite its theoretical untidiness. Lewis in 
his discussion of temporary intrinsics insists that some things have properties like shape without 
qualification.31 This is meant to contrast with other things that have shape with qualification. For 
the worm theorist, I am bent-shaped with qualification because I have a stage that is bent-shaped 
without qualification.32 So, there is a sense in which predication for the worm theorist is already 
disjunctive in character: for any material object, o, in the worm theorist’s ontology, o has a shape 
property F iff either o is an aggregate of o-stages and some o-stage is F without qualification or 
o is a stage and is F without qualification. Predication is untidy business with a four-





31 Lewis (1983b: 202 – 204)  
32 As a four-dimensional object whose has both bent and straight-shaped stages, I am both bent and straight with 
qualification. But this is no contradiction since I am bent in virtue of one set of bent-shaped stages and straight in 
virtue of a non-overlapping set of straight-shaped stages.   
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